aria2/src/WinTLSContext.cc, branch random-webseeding Aria2 download utility with uTP support http://x-nagi.com/cgit/aria2/atom?h=random-webseeding 2015-12-27T09:40:08Z make clang-format using clang-format-3.6 2015-12-27T09:40:08Z Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com 2015-12-27T09:39:47Z urn:sha1:b1132d6b10cd3791b9529d7031d723fd0e2d8215 Fixed some typos in code comments 2015-01-16T00:17:35Z Dan Fandrich dan@coneharvesters.com 2015-01-16T00:14:34Z urn:sha1:0538aa40da9eb22a20e124799a00dc519742b86a Move warn logic into SocketCore 2014-12-14T09:34:09Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2014-12-13T07:08:47Z urn:sha1:3c8704178a94a9ae3abde238aa4c369efd5f01a1 Also fiddle a bit with the WinTLS implementation, forcing "strong" crypto only for > SSLv3. Add --min-tls-version option 2014-12-06T08:50:35Z Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com 2014-12-05T15:26:43Z urn:sha1:73d752fb1cd01a9092191c9ac52ddb8fa378065f The --min-tls-version option specifies minimum SSL/TLS version to enable. Possible Values: SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 Default: TLSv1 Consistent style in the platform TLS implementations 2014-05-29T17:38:33Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2014-05-29T13:59:16Z urn:sha1:77f0f1395c1076eedabe6e5661f7b8f3e5166d60 WinTLS: Move some defines out of the header 2014-04-13T16:51:04Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2014-04-13T15:04:13Z urn:sha1:51beb4bfa7014c3107f9f3326128f1f6e20770d7 WinTLS: Make ca-file rejection a warning 2014-04-13T16:51:04Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2014-04-13T14:29:54Z urn:sha1:219fd5b4b7c371a19b05f5178a4989c8079499a9 WinTLS: Use SCH_USE_STRONG_CRYPTO 2014-04-13T16:50:54Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2014-04-13T14:04:24Z urn:sha1:8d55e305612cb4b6b934e53eef340dfed6a3d78d See: #217 WinTLS: Accept chains with no revocation information. 2014-04-13T16:50:38Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2014-04-12T15:55:11Z urn:sha1:0a51b8d172d3b51f8ff74f5410d936667aca4de2 This is kind what browser do anyway (IE, Firefox, Chrome tested), what AppleTLS does, what GnuTLS does and what OpenSSL does. Actually, most browsers will also be OK with the CRL/OCSP provider being offline. WinTLS will still fail in that case. Should revocation information be available in the trust chain (CRL or OCSP) the certificate still will be checked! "Real" CAs, aka. those provided by the OS or system CA bundle, usually provide revocation information and are thus still checked. It should be mostly (only?) custom (organization) CAs that lack revocation information, but those users might want to use aria2 in their intranets and VPNs anyway ;) See #217 WinTLS: Fix PKCS12 loading 2013-09-30T14:36:15Z Nils Maier maierman@web.de 2013-09-30T13:16:42Z urn:sha1:4c84af31be3ef0c23f896e3fc88a7ec5ef2778df It appears that, contrary to most documentation, CERT_CONTEXT* is eaten alive by AcquireCredentialsHandle(). Hence you cannot really reuse that.